Aggrete addresses the gap that RBAC never could. Resource-level access control and cross-resource aggregation are different problems, and no gateway on the market handles the second one.
There is another angle here. If the assistant authenticates with its own identity instead of inheriting the user's full permission set, the aggregation problem becomes harder to trigger. Each task chain starts clean with short-lived credentials. The assistant never had the broad scope, so it cannot accumulate a dangerous combination across sessions.
This does not replace what Aggrete does. Some tasks genuinely need access to multiple systems, and aggregation detection is the right tool for those. But identity separation changes the default from "the assistant can see everything I can see" to "the assistant can see what this task requires."
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Cai
A custodial email, a stablecoin wallet, a credential vault, and an agent-ready API — all at one @cai.com address.
Good catch on the gateway line! It was overstated, and I've rewritten it. The narrower claim: the good gateways do read content, they just classify one payload at a time, and aggregation is a judgment about a set.
On the identity: real control, but scoped credentials bound what an agent can reach, not what it can synthesize from what it legitimately reached. If a task needs CRM and payroll, the scoped token carries both, exactly the combination worth flagging. Cross-session accumulation also survives rotation, since retention happens in outputs and memory, not tokens.
And "never had the broad scope" assumes scope is knowable before execution, which dynamic tool discovery undercuts. Identity separation shrinks the scope; aggregation control governs what's left inside it. Different layers from my perspective.
Aggrete addresses the gap that RBAC never could. Resource-level access control and cross-resource aggregation are different problems, and no gateway on the market handles the second one.
There is another angle here. If the assistant authenticates with its own identity instead of inheriting the user's full permission set, the aggregation problem becomes harder to trigger. Each task chain starts clean with short-lived credentials. The assistant never had the broad scope, so it cannot accumulate a dangerous combination across sessions.
This does not replace what Aggrete does. Some tasks genuinely need access to multiple systems, and aggregation detection is the right tool for those. But identity separation changes the default from "the assistant can see everything I can see" to "the assistant can see what this task requires."